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DIFFERENT ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR MAKING SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION A FEDERALLY PROTECTED CLASS 
The Bill of Rights is codified in the U.S. Constitution’s first ten 
amendments, and guarantees certain inalienable and fundamental rights to 
Americans. The Fourteenth Amendment applies the Bill of Rights to state 
governments and guarantees that no one will be denied “equal protection 
of the laws” in any state.1 Embedded in the Bill of Rights is the First 
Amendment’s explicit guarantee that “Congress shall make no law . . .  
which abridges the freedom of speech.”2 Freedom of speech, in turn, re-
mains contentious due to the questions of what qualifies as speech. Con-
duct is not speech but can sometimes be quite expressive, and that expres-
sive conduct cannot be compelled or silenced by the government.3 
Simultaneously, Congress has the power under the United States 
Constitution to enact provisions that limit certain aspects of speech, in-
cluding expressive conduct.4 Understandably, First Amendment protec-
tion of expressive conduct clashes with certain laws meant to protect mem-
bers of certain groups. Regulations such as Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 and the Fair Housing Act of 1988 regulate individ-
ual conduct in prohibiting discrimination against female students and pro-
tected classes in housing.5 Federally protected classes under the Fair Hous-
ing Act and its progeny are limited to a sprinkling of narrow categories: 
sex, race, class, religion, national origin, familial status, disability, and 
age.6 Notably absent from that list of categories is sexual orientation, a 
politically contentious class that has seen some significant advancements 
in existing equal protection jurisprudence. 
Throughout America’s long history of barring rights to some people 
that were freely granted to others, same-sex individuals have always strug-
gled for basic humanity. In 1996, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down a proposed amendment to Colorado’s constitution that would have 
prohibited same-sex individuals from obtaining any protection against dis-
crimination because the amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.7 Another victory came for same-sex individuals 
in 2003, when the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples could not be 
  
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 3. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 4. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
 5. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). See also Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012). 
 7. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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criminally convicted for engaging in same-sex intimacy.8 Most recently, 
in 2015, the Supreme Court stated that same-sex couples have a funda-
mental right to marriage.9 The current tides surging in favor of gay and 
lesbian rights seem to indicate that there might be another protected class 
coming down the pipeline, another current of humanity for a marginalized 
group of Americans. 
While sexual orientation is not a protected class under federal law, 
Colorado opted to include sexual orientation as a protected class within its 
anti-discrimination laws.10 In 2014, Colorado enacted C.R.S. § 24-34-601, 
which prohibits discrimination based on “disability, race, creed, color, sex, 
sexual orientation, marital status, or ancestry” in places of public accom-
modation.11 Under this law, a place of public accommodation is defined as 
“any place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place 
offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to 
the public.”12 It was under this law that Masterpiece Cakeshop (Master-
piece)— a Littleton bakery specializing in wedding cakes—was brought 
before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission for refusing to create a wed-
ding cake celebrating a same-sex union between two potential customers.13  
When complainants Charlie Craig and David Mullins sought a wed-
ding cake from Masterpiece, same-sex marriage was not legal in Colo-
rado.14 Craig and Mullins were told that Masterpiece did not make wed-
ding cakes for same-sex marriages due to the Christian beliefs of the 
owner, Jack Phillips, about same-sex marriages not comporting with reli-
gious scripture.15 Both Craig and Mullins filed a complaint with the Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission, and the administrative law judge deter-
mined that Masterpiece had violated Colorado’s public accommodations 
law.16 The Colorado Court of Appeals Division I affirmed, reasoning that 
the conduct Masterpiece engaged in—baking and decorating cakes—was 
not expressive, and even if it was, the government’s interest in protecting 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals from discrimination did not touch 
that expressive component.17 Rather, Colorado’s public accommodation 
law and its ensuing administrative order to the bakery regarding its service 
policies targeted the act of selling goods to lesbian, gay, and bisexual in-
dividuals, instead of mandating support for same-sex marriages.18 
  
 8. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 9. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 10. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2016).  
 11. Id. at § 601(2)(a). 
 12. Id. at § 601(1). 
 13. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 278–80 (2015). 
 14. Id. at 276. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 277–80. 
 17. Id. at 293–95. 
 18. Id. at 291. 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals invoked intriguing ideas about view-
points that are ancillary to discrimination. Of note, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals stated that same-sex marriage “is closely correlated with sexual 
orientation,” and thus can be equated with “discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.”19 Essentially, only lesbians, gays, or bisexual individ-
uals are going to marry others of the same sex, so refusing someone a 
wedding cake on that ground equals discriminating against him or her due 
to his or her orientation. The problem becomes where to draw this line 
between viewpoint discrimination and earnest, constitutional anti-discrim-
ination law. 
Whether at the federal or local level, the government cannot mandate 
a viewpoint on a specific subject.20 Unless the government is regulating 
funding for one of its programs, the government is limited in regulating 
the content of speech, particularly regarding viewpoint.21 The rationale 
given is that America does not want the government controlling its citi-
zens’ thoughts.22 However, problems arise when a situation like Master-
piece necessitates some regulation to inhere basic human dignity in a 
group that is frequently and violently discriminated against. 
Violence against lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals because of 
their sexuality is well-documented. Nearly 20% of all bias-related inci-
dents reported to the FBI in 2014 were due to sexuality.23 Among lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual individuals between fifteen and twenty-four years of 
age, 42.8% of those individuals “seriously considered” suicide as com-
pared to heterosexual youth, of whom just 14.8% youth seriously consid-
ered suicide.24 These statistics are particularly poignant when juxtaposed 
with bias-related incidents against someone due to her sexuality. Even if 
specific discrimination does not result in a bias-related attack that is re-
portable or reported to law enforcement, the impact of this discrimination 
against lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth is reflected in those high suicide 
rates. 
Much as the legal profession might wish that it exists in a pleasant 
vacuum over the rest of America’s citizenry, law has a tangible impact on 
humanity. Colorado felt that impact warranted elevating sexual orientation 
as a protected class. It is troubling that the United States disagrees, urging 
that this law should not apply to Masterpiece in oral argument because 
there is no legal history warranting the elevation of sexual orientation to 
  
 19. Id. at 282. 
 20. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 582 (1998). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
 23. Latest Hate Crime Statistics Available, FBI.GOV (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/latest-hate-crime-statistics-available (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 24. Suicidal Behavior Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth: 2016 Youth, AM. ASS’N 
SUICIDOLOGY, http://www.suicidology.org/Portals/14/Re-Format-
ted%20LGB%20Youth%202016%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf?ver=2016-11-16-105952-633 (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2018). 
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the same status accorded race under equal protection law.25 The United 
States is correct in this regard; there is no existing case law that treats sex-
ual orientation as an innate characteristic that warrants protected status un-
der federal law.26 But precedent cannot be made without someone first 
lowering that gavel. Sexual orientation must become a protected class to 
not only comport with America’s fundamental values of equality and lib-
erty but also to mitigate the tangible harms such discrimination has caused 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals.27 
There are a couple major concerns with the suggested approach of 
raising sexual orientation to a protected class. The first major concern is 
that treating sexual orientation like race will mandate a viewpoint for bak-
ers like Phillips of Masterpiece. In other words, Phillips will be required 
to make a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins regardless of his personal, 
sincerely-held religious views.28 Essentially, the government will have the 
power to mandate a viewpoint for its citizens to take on prominent political 
issues. 
The second major concern regarding this approach to sexual orienta-
tion is that it will allow the government to compel speech.29 Phillips would 
not only have to make Craig and Mullins a general wedding cake but he 
would also be required to make them a cake stating his support for their 
union.30 If the government endorses a viewpoint as warranting protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment then it can require people to express that 
viewpoint in their speech and condemn those who express opposition to 
that viewpoint. 
Both the above concerns, while valid, are without merit. Viewpoint 
discrimination is fundamentally disallowed in American jurisprudence, 
but mandating that a bakery serve lesbian, gay, and bisexual customers in 
the same way it serves heterosexual customers does not clash with this 
legal dogma. One does not have to support same-sex marriages in order to 
serve same-sex individuals with a wedding cake as she serves heterosexual 
individuals with wedding cakes. Opposition to same-sex marriage can be 
expressed in other ways without discriminating against same-sex individ-
uals in one’s public business, such as website announcements stating that 
compliance with local law does not reflect the business’s opinion or that 
of its owners. This also eliminates the concern that the government can 
compel speech. The government is not compelling speech in requiring that 
  
 25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argu-
ment_transcripts/2017/16-111_onjq.pdf.  
 26. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 574–75 
(1995).  
 27. See AM. ASS’N SUICIDOLOGY, supra note 24. 
 28. Transcript of Oral Argument at 104–05, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 
16-111), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-
111_onjq.pdf. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
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people who operate businesses in places of public accommodation serve 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people as they serve heterosexuals. Rather, the 
government is regulating commercial speech by ensuring that those who 
operate businesses in places of public accommodation cannot turn some-
one away because of an innate characteristic. 
As with race, sex, national origin, and the color of one’s skin, sexual 
orientation is an innate characteristic. A person cannot change whether she 
is interested in men or women, no more than she can change her sex. It is 
unjust to permit corporations and their owners, like Masterpiece, to refuse 
service to someone because she likes women. This is the antithesis of 
America’s fundamental belief that all humans are created equal and, there-
fore, entitled to equal treatment under the laws.31 
Because sexual orientation is not yet a protected class under federal 
law, it is permissible under federal law to discriminate against someone 
because of her sexuality. While it is not laudable to refuse to hire someone 
because she is gay or grant her a loft in a brand new downtown high rise 
due to her sexuality, it is acceptable under current federal law. Colorado 
has decided that sexual orientation is entitled the same protections granted 
to sex, race, national origin, and religion. Yet, Colorado’s public accom-
modations law is now up for grabs in the United States Supreme Court. 
To uphold the law, and to ensure that lesbian, gay, and bisexual indi-
viduals are accorded the same dignity freely afforded their heterosexual 
counterparts, the Supreme Court must make sexual orientation a protected 
class. Making sexual orientation a protected class will ensure that Colo-
rado’s public accommodation law survives this current challenge against 
it. Likewise, this increase in status will prevent the sort of discrimination 
that actively harms lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals, such as employ-
ment and housing discrimination. Contrary to what Masterpiece and the 
United States asserted in their oral arguments before the United States Su-
preme Court, individuals who disagree with the view that lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual individuals are equal to heterosexual people or entitled to marital 
access would remain free to disagree. They would simply not be allowed 
to refuse to make or sell a cake to a gay couple because of that couple’s 
homosexuality. Ultimately, America’s legal profession needs to realize 
that, regardless of precedent, the discrimination perpetuated by Master-
piece in Colorado is authorizing different, unequal treatment for lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual people. The tangible harms caused by this discrimination 
warrant protecting sexual orientation the same way America protects 
women against sexism or racial minorities against racism. It is time Amer-
ica started living up to its self-purported ideals of equality and liberty. 
  
 31. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. 
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